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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff and Appellee,

:

v.

:

TRAVIS E. TELFORD,

:

Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 950560-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for murder, a first degree felony. Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-203 (1996). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §782a-3(2)(j) (1996) (pourover from the Utah Supreme Court, R. 243).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress
contents of three letters he wrote from Box Elder County Jail? An appellate court
reviews the factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress under a
clearly erroneous standard, and reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based on
those facts for correctness. State v. Trover. 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995) (citations
omitted). In addition, this Court considers the facts in a light most favorable to the trial
court's ruling. LL (citing P_ena, 869 at 935-36).

2. Were defendant's right to confrontation and his right against selfincrimination violated by the trial court's admission of his redacted confession,
and a limitation on defendant's cross-examination of the witness who presented the
redacted statement? A trial court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for clear abuse of
discretion. State v. Kinross, 906 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1995) (citing State v. Pena. 869
P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); State v. Iorg. 801 P.2d 938, 939 (Utah App. 1990).
3. If defendant had been tried separately and his confession had not been
redacted, is it reasonably likely that he would have been acquitted? On review, an
appellate court reverses a denial of a motion to sever only if the appellant affirmatively
shows that his or her right to a fair trial has been impaired. State v. Jaimez. 817 P.2d
822, 825 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Velarde. 734 P.2d 440, 445 & n.10 (Utah
1986)). In Velarde, the Utah Supreme Court analogized this standard of review to
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a), which holds that any error which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. The court emphasized that substantial
rights are affected only when, absent the error, there would have been a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result. I$L
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Constitution, Amendment V:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or the indictment of a Grand
Jury . . . ; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived or life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .
U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . .
to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 12:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to testify in his own behalf . . . to
be confronted by the witnesses against him. . . . The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself . . . .
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Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1996):
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct.
Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l(2)(b) (1996):
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
conduct or in the same criminal episode.
Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l(2)(d) (1996):
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense,
they shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion on motion or
otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice.
Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l(4)(a) (1996):
If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate
trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, ir provide other
relief as justice requires.
Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l(4)(b) (1996):
A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is
waived if the motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling
on a motion by defendant for severance, the court may order the
prosecutor to disclose any statements made by the defendants which he
intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in an information with murder, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1996) (R. 1-2). He was tried jointly with a
codefendant, Brandon A. Dahlquist, and both were convicted in a jury trial (R. 216).
Defendant was sentenced to five years to life, with a consecutive firearm enhancement
of one to five years, and $23,072.00 restitution ($6,500.00 of which is joint and several
with the codefendant) (R. 231-32). Defendant timely appealed his conviction (R. 23137).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it are
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,
1205-06 (Utah 1993).
The murder victim, Troy Weston, had repeatedly "burned" drug users in the
Riverdale-Ogden area by selling them drugs he had diluted (R. 1161-62, 1196-97).
One such drug user told the codefendants, themselves drug users (R. 2138, 2146-47),
that "there had to be something done to" Weston (R. 1161). About a week before the
murder, the codefendants confronted the victim during a party and "beat him up" (R.
1162-69).
At about 9:00 a.m. on the morning of the murder, the codefendants drove to
Weston's Riverdale home where they spoke briefly with the victim (R. 1238-41). The
5

codefendants were driving in a Chevrolet Blazer that belonged to codefendant
Dahlquist's father (R. 1424-26). The codefendants returned in the Blazer to the
victim's home at about 10:00 a.m. and the victim went with them (R. 1242-44).
Later that morning, defendant's sister saw the three near Godfather's Pizza in
Ogden, where codefendant Dahlquist was working under the hood of the Blazer (R.
1448-51; 1454-55; 1499-1500). The three left Godfather's in the Blazer at about 11:15
to 11:30 a.m. (R. 1328).
Between 11:30 and noon, an Air Force captain, saw three men in the Blazer at
the murder scene in the south Willard Bay area, which is about a twenty to thirty
minute drive from the Godfather's Pizza in Ogden (R. 1283-86, 1290-91, 1293-94,
1309, 1558). Based on what he later saw and heard from about 200 yards away, and
based on his experience with firearms, it initially appeared to the witness that the three
men were shooting at targets with a .22 caliber, semiautomatic pistol (R. 1288-95). A
few minutes later, the witness heard shots and a scream, and saw two men run, get in
the Blazer, and speed from the scene. I$L The victim was found dead in a ditch near
where the Blazer had been parked (R. 923-68, 974-79, 1047-48; State's Exhibit 5). He
had been shot eight times with a .22 semiautomatic pistol which was never recovered
(R. 1562, 1572, 1591-92, 1597-98, 1778). Defendant admitted in a letter from jail that
he had destroyed the murder weapon (R. 1763). Some live .22 rounds, matching shell

6

casings at the murder scene, were found in defendant's vehicle (R. 1066, 1097-98,
1776-77; State's Exhibit 39).
Around 12:00 noon on the day of the murder, the codefendants dropped off the
Blazer to have it painted at a location about twenty to thirty minutes from the murder
scene (R. 1344-51, 1775-76, 1820, 1824-25). Defendant paid for the paint job (R.
1350).
A Chips Ahoy cookie box, set up as a target at the murder scene, had
defendant's fingerprint on it and matched the lid found in the Blazer a few days after
the murder (R. 978-79, 1051, 1067-68, 1513, 1101-02; State's Exhibits 23 and 33).
Defendant admitted buying the box of cookies on the morning of the murder (R. 1777).
At issue under Point I. Excerpts from letters defendant sent to friends from jail
after his arrest were read to the jury:
I'm sorry truly. But the death of Troy has been hanging on my mind,
driving me crazy. I am going to tell the police the truth. If I don't I get
life. Actually the death penalty will probably be imposed. I have a very
guilty conscience. I will take the rap for destroying the gun. . . . I'm
sorry, but there is no other way.
(R. 1763; State's Exhibit 37A).
The next part of this letter I hope you don't hold against me because I lied
to you and everybody else but please keep it quiet until after court. I
hope you and everyone else will forgive me for lying to you and to them,
but I was scared. I didn't want to admit to being there. As a friend
please don't tell anyone. I will do that when I get out. And please
forgive me for lying to you. If word gets out that I was there it could put
me in prison for life. I'll do it myself in a couple of weeks when I'm
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free. I'm sorry to tell you and have you keep it a secret, but I have to tell
someone. I'm going crazy knowing this and not being able to tell anyone
and that is the reason I didn't want to go to the funeral. But please don't
tell anyone and I will be forever in your debt. Thinking of you a lot,
Travis.
(R. 1764; State's Exhibit 37A).
Nicole, I'm sitting here again. It's about 4:30 a.m. I woke up having the
nightmare about Troy's death. How I was sitting there discussing if he
wanted to buy the gun how he would pay for it. I bet I still have skid
marks in my pants that I was wearing. You never know, though, they
might still try to press it on me. Just because I held out on telling them
what they need to know. Maybe if I just die I won't have to. But if I do
that then my daughter will be without a father. Thinking of you a lot.
P.S., send me Jimmy's address.
(R. 1764-65; State's Exhibit 37A). (Defendant makes no claim that he was prejudiced
by the excerpt of these statements.)
At issue under Points II and III. A redacted version of defendant's pretrial
confession to Detective Hansen was also read to the jury. The purpose of the redaction
was to remove all references to the codefendant who claimed he was elsewhere at the
time of the murder. This is the redacted version (as used in this brief, "redacted
confession" refers to this April 14, 1994 statement to Detective David Hansen):
On April 14th, 1994, while enroute to Box Elder County jail with
prisoner Travis Telford, he told me about the day of the homicide of Troy
Weston. Since his arrest he's attempted numerous times to tell me of the
incident. Each time he's attempted to tell me I would inform him that he
had secured an attorney and must have his permission to talk to me about
the incident.
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About 4:15 while on 1-15 enroute to the jail, Travis, without being
asked, started to talk about the homicide of Troy Weston. He said that
Troy had inquired about buying a gun because he had some people who
wanted to hurt him. He said he went and picked up Troy Weston at his
house and headed out to Willard to show him the gun.
He said that when he and Troy arrived out in Willard out came a
small automatic .22 caliber handgun. He said that they had parked on the
side of the road to shoot. They then got out and went over to shoot the
gun and Troy asked how did it work. Travis said that when Troy asked if
it worked, he was shot in the shoulder. He said Troy screamed and said
what are you doing. Troy then was shot again. This time twice in the
back, because Troy's body had then shifted sideways.
He then said Troy continued to tell to stop it. He then said that one
of the bullets must have hit Troy's spine because he quit moving and just
dropped to the ground. Troy was then shot again twice more in the front
and the gun jammed. He said it either jammed or ran out of ammunition.
Travis went back to the Blazer and got another clip. When he got back to
the Blazer the new clip was loaded and the gun was placed under Troy's
chin and the trigger pulled one last time. He then said Troy did not move
any more and he dragged the body about 30 feet to the ditch. He then got
back to the Blazer and sped back to Ogden.
(R. 1409-10).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress
contents of three letters he wrote from Box Elder County Jail since defendant had
no legitimate expectation of privacy in his nonprivileged, outgoing mail. Defendant
claims that admitting excerpts of three letters he wrote from jail violated his
constitutional right to privacy. Defendant had neither a subjective nor a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the three letters in question which he provided to jailers in
unsealed envelopes. Prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy, and prison
9

officials do not violate the constitution when they read and copy inmates'
nonprivileged, outgoing mail.
2. Defendant's right against self-incrimination and right to confront
witnesses were not violated by the trial court's admission of his redacted
confession, or by a limitation on defendant's cross-examination of the witness who
presented the redacted confession. Defendant argues that the unredacted confession
was exculpatory, that admission of the redacted statement violated his right against selfincrimination because it forced him to testify about what was redacted, and that limiting
his cross-examination of Detective Hansen violated his confrontation right and
precluded him from eliciting testimony that would have been exculpatory.
Defendant's assertions are unsupported by the record. Defendant has made no
valid proffer of exculpatory evidence he was prevented from presenting in his defense.
Defendant's decision not to testify both establishes that his right against selfincrimination was not violated, and belies his claim that his testimony would have been
exculpatory.
Defendant had a right to confront the witnesses against him, and his counsel
cross-examined Detective Hansen at length. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion
when he limited the scope of that cross-examination to matters related to the witness's
direct examination.
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3. If defendant had been tried separately and his confession to Detective
Hansen had not been redacted, it is not reasonably likely that he would have been
acquitted. Defendant argues that the trial court's denial of his severance motion
denied him a fair trial. Defendant's confession that he was present during the murder,
got another clip to load in the gun after the victim had already been shot, dragged the
body into a ditch, and destroyed the murder weapon would be sufficient to convict him
as a party to the murder had he been tried separately.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONTENTS OF THRFE
LETTERS HE WROTE FROM BOX ELDER COUNTY JAIL
SINCE DEFENDANT HAD NO LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN HIS NONPRIVTLEGED, OUTGOING MAIL
Defendant claims that admitting excerpts of three letters he wrote from jail
violated his constitutional right to privacy (Def. Br. at 12). While defendant concedes
that he was on notice that his mail would be scanned before being sent, he argues that
he was not on notice that his mail could be copied and forwarded to the county
attorney's office (LL). Defendant argues a distinction without a difference. His
argument concedes that he had no expectation of privacy in the challenged letters.
While in Box Elder County Jail awaiting trial, defendant wrote several letters
(S££, Sa&u, State's Exhibits 35 and 36). Jail personnel copied some of them and
11

forwarded the copies to the prosecutor (R. 331). Defendant made a written motion
before trial to suppress these letters, arguing that their admission would violate his
constitutional rights (R. 93-95, 97, 103-08). The trial court denied the motion (R. 153,
375), and excerpts from the letters were read to the jury (R. 1763-65; State's Exhibit
37A).
This court reviews the factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to
suppress under a clearly erroneous standard, and reviews the trial court's conclusions
of law based on those facts for correctness. State v. Trover. 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah
1995) (citations omitted). In addition, this Court considers the facts in a light most
favorable to the trial court's ruling. LL (citing Pena. 869 at 935-36).
The Box Elder County Jail outgoing mail procedure is important to put
defendant's claim in context. It states:
a.
The jail staff will pick up the outgoing mail at the service of the
noon meal and head count.
b.
Outgoing mail will abide by the following rules:
(1) Envelopes will not be sealed, except for privileged
correspondence to attorneys or the judicial [sic]. Each letter
will contain a complete return address on it. Mail failing to
meet this criteria will be returned to the inmate.
(2) The Staff member picking up the mail will take it to
the jail booking office where it will be inspected and
scanned during the afternoon and night duty watch.
Upon completion, the letters will be sealed. . . .
(R. 143; emphasis supplied).
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Defendant claims that copying the three letters before they were sent violated his
"constitutional right to privacy" (Def. Br. at 12). The two-part "legitimate expectation
of privacy" test is well established. First, a defendant must demonstrate that he or she
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the object searched. Second, a defendant
must demonstrate that this expectation was one that society views as reasonable. State
v. Kolster. 869 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005,
1007; State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Taylor. 818
P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App. 1991). Defendant fails on both counts.
A. No subjective expectation. First, defendant concedes he was aware that jail
personnel were inspecting and scanning his mail before it was being sent (R. 104; Def.
Br. at 16). In fact, in keeping with jail policy (R. 143), defendant provided the three
letters in question in unsealed envelopes to State authorities for the very purpose of
allowing them to inspect the letters. This conduct establishes that defendant had no
subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of those letters. See State v. Webb.
790 P.2d 65 (Utah App. 1990) (a legitimate expectation of privacy requires first that
the defendant "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy").
Defendant attempts to draw a distinction between notice that his mail would be
screened and notice that it would be copied and forwarded to the prosecutor in his case
(Def. Br. at 16). But since defendant knew in the first instance that his letters were not
private, this distinction is meaningless. See Kolster. 869 P.2d at 995 ("we look to
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how defendants manifest their expectations regarding the object searched to determine
their subjective privacy interest").
B. No reasonable expectation. Second, whatever expectations of privacy
defendant had in his mail, they are not those that society views as reasonable. In his
pretrial motion and in his brief, defendant has cited only cases that support the right of
jailers to examine outgoing mail (R. 103-06; Def. Br. at 15-20). In fact, during the
hearing on the suppression motion, defense counsel conceded, "it's true I was not able
to find any cases that explicitly stated or explicitly supported my contention concerning
the letters" (R. 372). Indeed, case authority is expressly contrary to defendant's
position.
In Hudson v. Palmer. 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3202 (1984), the Supreme Court held that
"prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy, and . . .the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells . . . ." £ f State v.
Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983) (unlike either prisoners or law-abiding citizens,
parolees have a "diminished expectation of privacy" when it comes to warrantless
searches and seizures).
In United States v. Wtelen, 940 F.2d 1027, 1035 (7th Cir.), cert.denied. 112
S.Ct. 403 (1991), the Seventh Circuit specifically held that because of reasonable
concern for prison security, "prison officials do not violate the constitution when they
read inmates' outgoing letters." (quoting United States v. Brown. 878 F.2d 222, 225
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inmate's attorney. See State v. Shimp. 562 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1977) (interest of
state in monitoring no/iprivileged correspondence justifies minor burden placed on
freedom to communicate with friends and relatives). But that is not the situation here.

In United States v. Kelton, 791 F.2d 101 (8th Cir.), cert-denied, 479 U.S. 989
(1986), the Eighth Circuit specifically rejected the contention that regulations
authorizing prison officials to read and copy non-privileged mail violate inmate's
Fourth Amendment rights.
Finally, defendant's citation of cases dealing with censorship of prison mail and
implicating the First Amendment are inapposite since he has made no showing either
that the letters he wrote were censored, or that they were not delivered to the intended
recipients. Sfi£, £ ^ , Treffv. Galetka. 74 F.3d 191 (10th Cir. 1996) ("A refusal to
process any mail from a prisoner impermissibly interferes with the addressee's First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights").
In sum, both on factual and legal grounds, defendant had no expectation of
privacy in the letters he sent from jail. No constitutional right was violated, and
defendant's argument is without merit.
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Point II
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND
HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES WERE NOT
VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF HIS
REDACTED CONFESSION, OR BY A LIMITATION ON
DEFENDANT'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE
HANSEN
Defendant argues that admission of the redacted confession violated his right
against self-incrimination because it forced him to testify, and that limiting his crossexamination of Detective Hansen violated his confrontation right and precluded him
from eliciting testimony that would have been exculpatory (Def. Br. at 20-39).'
Defendant's assertions are unsupported by the record. Further, defendant's
decision not to testify both establishes that his right against self-incrimination was not
violated, and belies his claim that his testimony would have been exculpatory. Finally,
defendant's counsel cross-examined Detective Hansen at length. The trial judge did not
abuse his discretion when he limited the scope of that cross-examination to matters
related to defendant, as opposed to codefendant.
A. No proffer of exculpatory evidence. In response to codefendant's severance
motion, the trial court required the redaction of all of defendant's statements to
eliminate any reference to codefendant (R. 546), and gave a limiting instruction that the
statements could only be considered against defendant (R. 1168, 1408, 1422-23, 17631

These arguments are found under both Points II and III of defendant's brief,
and are consolidated here.
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1764, 1765). The rationale was that admitting such references through Detective
Hansen would deny codefendant's right to cross-examine the declarant. See
Richardson v. Marsh. 481 U.S. (1987). Defendant's assertions that his unredacted
confession contained exculpatory evidence, and that he was precluded from presenting
other exculpatory evidence, are unsupported by the record. The record does not
establish that the redactions from defendant's confession, defendant's testimony, or
Detective Hansen's cross-examination would have exculpated defendant in any degree.
Defendant proffered no such evidence, including the unredacted confession, to the trial
court to establish a record for appeal.
An appellate court "will not set aside a verdict because of the erroneous
exclusion of evidence unless a proffer of evidence appears of record, and [the Court]
believe[s] that the excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in
bringing about a different verdict." State v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d 439, 445 (Utah 1996)
(quoting State v. Ramme] 721 P.2d 498, 499-500 (Utah 1986); §££ also. Hill v. Hartog.
658 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah 1983); Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2).
In State v. Christofferson. 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah App. 1990), this Court held
that, "[w]hen raising objections on appeal, appellant has the burden to see that the
record contains the materials necessary to support his appeal." An appellate court
"'cannot speculate on the existence of facts that do not appear in the record. When
crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to
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support the action of the trial court.'" I$L (quoting State v. Theison. 709 P.2d 307, 309
(Utah 1985); see alSQ Intermountain Power Agency v. Bowers-Irons Recreation Land &
Cattle Co.. 786 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (in the absence of a complete
record, we presume that the trial court's findings are supported by sufficient
evidence)); State v. Cantu. 750 P.2d 591, n.7 (Utah 1988) ("Defendant has the burden
to preserve his points on appeal by making an adequate record below").
Defendant's counsel suggested during closing argument that defendant was under
duress during the murder (see R. 2279, line 3; R. 2280, lines 15-16). Duress, or
compulsion, is an affirmative defense. Utah Code Ann. 76-2-302 (1996). In State v.
Ott. 763 P.2d 810, 812 (Utah App. 1988), this Court rejected a defendant's claim of
duress in a prosecution for theft because the defendant "failed to demonstrate specific
imminent threats and . . . that there were no reasonable legal alternatives to committing
the crime." (Citing State v. Tuttle. 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986)). Defendant has likewise
failed to demonstrate "specific imminent threats" in this case.
Defendant had at least two opportunities to make such an express proffer during
trial. During discussions about the redaction of defendant's statement to Detective
Hansen, and with the unredacted statement before him, the trial court responded to
defendant's objections, noting
[U]nder the law, and under the instructions that the jury will receive on
accomplices, if the statement came in with no redactions, it is in essence a
confession anyway. If the jury finds, as a matter of fact, that defendant
18

Telford went to the vehicle, got more ammunition, brought the clip back
so that the shooting, or execution at that point, could be completed, then
he has in effect confessed to being part and parcel of that crime.
(R. 880). Instead of arguing that the unredacted statement, or any other preferred
evidence, supported a duress defense, defendant's trial counsel responded, "That's
correct. . . ." LL2
Later, after his statement to Detective Hansen had been redacted, defendant
argued that it was misleading since it gave "the impression that he confessed to the
murder" (R. 1397). The prosecutor responded, "[Defendant] did confess to murder
because he confessed to being an accomplice" I$L The prosecutor then noted that
defendant had admitted getting the extra clip during the murder to finish off the victim,
and destroying the murder weapon. I$L (Defendant also admitted, in the redacted
statement, to disposing of the body, R. 1409-1410). Significantly, defendant neither
objected to the prosecutor's characterization, nor argued that the unredacted statement,
which was before the court, supported a duress defense. I*L
By order dated January 15, 1997, this Court truck defendant's fictionalized
"unredacted confession" from his brief. As of the filing of this brief, defendant has not
moved to supplement the record on appeal with the actual statement, pursuant to rule
11, Utah R. App. P. Absent any information in the record establishing that the

2

Counsel also argued that defendant might be guilty of a lesser included offense
of murder.
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redacted portions of defendant's confession, defendant's testimony, or Detective
Hansen's cross-examination would have been exculpated him in any way, defendant's
claims are completely unsupported. Since defendant has provided no basis on which to
address the merits of his claims, this Court should decline to consider them. See

Argwlles, 921 P.2d at 445; United States v, Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 590 (10th Cir.
1984) (appellate court in severance case held, "We will not find prejudice based on
mere conjecture").
B. No violation of the right against self-incrimination. Defendant argues that
the redactions from his pretrial confession forced him to testify (although he ultimately
chose not to). If he had testified, defendant asserts, his testimony would have been
exculpatory and resulted in his acquittal (Def. Br. at 35-36). Defendant nevertheless
refuses to proffer what his testimony might have been (see A. above).
Defendant's "prospective" argument is without merit: he was not, in fact,
compelled to testify, and he has not, in fact, provided any evidence to this Court that
his testimony would have been exculpatory. Hence, defendant improperly attempts to
use his Fifth Amendment protection not as a shield, but as a sword. State v. Maguire.
529 P.2d 421 (Utah 1974) ("what was given to him generally as a shield should not be
used as a sword").
Criminal defendants have both a constitutional right to testify in their own
behalf, and a right against self-incrimination. Utah Constitution, article I, section 12;
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Rock v. Arkansas. 107 S.Ct. 2704 (1987); U.S. Constitution, amend. IV; see also Utah
Code Ann. §77-l-6(l)(c) ("In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled . . . to
testify in his own behalf . . . ."). Either right may be waived. See, e.g.. State v.
BlQQk&, 833 P.2d 362 (Utah App. 1992); Miranda v. Arizona. 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
Defendant chose to waive his right to testify. By that choice, he chose not to waive his
right against self-incrimination.
It is clear defendant decided before trial that he would not testify. In a pretrial
hearing held March 28, 1995, defendant so advised the trial court saying that he
believed he could get what he needed for his defense out of his pretrial statements that
the State intended to offer (R. 528-29).3 Defendant's decision to waive his right to
testify, therefore, even after the redacted confession was admitted, belies his current
claim that his testimony would have been exculpatory. Indeed, defendant's decision not
to testify safeguarded his right against self'-incrimination.*
Defendant's situation was no different from any criminal defendant faced with
the introduction of incriminating evidence, including the defendant's own pretrial

3

In his closing argument, defendant suggested a duress defense based on
"reasonable inferences" (see R. 2279, line 3; R. 2280, lines 15-16). However,
codefendant's counsel was correct when he argued that *[t]here is no evidence in the
record" that codefendant threatened defendant to participate in the murder (R. 2295).
4

Defendant has made no suggestion that his pretrial statement to Detective
Hansen was involuntary or violated his right against self-incrimination. It was
obviously admitted under Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2) as an admission of a party-opponent.
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admissions. £fi£ Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2). "'Introduction of any evidence, direct or
circumstantial, tending to implicate the defendant in the alleged crime, increases the
pressure on him to testify. The mere massing of evidence against a defendant cannot
be regarded as a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination/" State v. Smith.
726 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Utah 1986) (quoting Barnes v. United States. 93 S.Ct. 2357,
2363 (1973)).
Since defendant chose not to testify, it is a tautology to say that he cannot
establish that he was compelled to testify. Neither has he established that admission of
his redacted statement otherwise violated his right against self-incrimination.5 See
National Treasury Employees Union v. U.S. Department of the Treasury. 25 F.3d 237
(5th Cir. 1994) (standing in Fifth Amendment cases will fall generally into two
categories: first, where a plaintiff remains silent and is then subjected to some sanction
or penalty for refusing to testify; second, where a plaintiff has refrained from invoking
the privilege, given an incriminating statement, and then seeks to bar the use of the
statement in a later criminal proceeding—either on the ground that the statement was
coerced, or on the related ground that the witness's ostensible waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination was not knowing and voluntary).
C. No violation of the right to confront a witness. Defendant argues that the
trial court "effectively restricted [him] from engaging in any meaningful cross5

Sfi£ n.4 above.
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examination" of Detective Hansen because he was restricted from asking questions
about codefendant's involvement in the murder (Def. Br. at 36).
Under the Sixth Amendment, defendant had a right to confront the witnesses
against him, and his counsel cross-examined Detective Hansen at length (R. 14101422). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he limited the scope of that
cross-examination to the substance of the witness's direct testimony, and to matters
related to defendant, as opposed to matters involving the codefendant.
In connection with his ruling on codefendant's severance motion, which resulted
in redaction of defendant's confession, and in relation to defendant's cross-examination
of Detective Hansen, the trial court ruled that defendant would "not be allowed to ask
any questions that will make reference to [codefendant]" and could "not ask any
questions that would attempt to elicit what has been redacted" (R. 548).
"The essence of the confrontation right is the opportunity to have the accusing
witness in court and subject to cross examination, so that bias and credibility can be
evaluated by the finder of fac.." State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1986). The
confrontation right is not absolute, and the trial court has discretion in limiting the
scope and extent of cross-examination. State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985)
(citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)); Utah R. Evid. 610(b)
("Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination
and matters affecting the credibility of the witness").
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Since defendant was himself the source of the redacted statement read to the jury
by Detective Hansen (R. 1407-1410), his cross-examination of Detective Hansen,
which occupies 12 pages of trial transcript, appropriately dealt with the circumstances
of the taking and transmission of the statement (R. 1410-1422). As already noted,
defendant has neither challenged the voluntariness of his statement to Detective Hansen
(see n.4 above), nor did he proffer to the trial court exculpatory evidence he purports
he could have elicited during his cross-examination of Detective Hansen (s££ A.
above). Therefore, defendant has not established a violation of his confrontation right,
how he was prejudiced, or why the trial court's restriction on the scope of this crossexamination was an abuse of discretion.
In sum, since defendant failed to proffer to the trial court exculpatory evidence
he now claims he was prevented from presenting, this Court should decline to consider
his claims. In any event, defendant's right against self-incrimination was not violated
because he chose not to take the stand to explain his incriminating pretrial statements.
And, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it restricted the scope of
defendant's cross-examination of Detective Hansen on matters relevant to his direct
testimony.
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Point HI
IF DEFENDANT HAD BEEN TRIED SEPARATELY AND HIS
CONFESSION TO DETECTIVE HANSEN HAD NOT BEEN
REDACTED, IT IS NOT REASONABLY LIKELY THAT HE
WOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED
Defendant argues that the trial court's denial of his severance motion denied him
a fair trial (Def. Br. at 20-31). He specifically argues that his defense was antagonistic
to and irreconcilable with codefendant's, and that a more favorable outcome was
reasonably likely had he been tried separately (Def. Br. at 24-31).
While codefendant made and renewed several motions for severance, defendant
made a single motion to sever on March 28, 1995 (R. 529-30), which the trial court
denied (R. 546). Defendant renewed his motion to sever after jury selection on the first
day of trial (April 3, 1995; R. 775-82), and the trial court referred to its prior ruling
denying the original motion (R. 782).
An appellate court reverses a denial of a motion to sever only if the appellant
affirmatively shows that his or her right to a fair trial has been impaired. Jaimez. 817
P.2d at 825; Velarde. 734 P.2d at 445 & n.10. The test is whether, absent the error,
there would have been a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. Id.
A. Antagonistic defenses. Defendant argues that the codefendants' defenses
were antagonistic and irreconcilable, since codefendant's defense was alibi, and
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defendant's defense was that he was "only a witness at best, a coerced participant at
worst", and that codefendant committed the murder (Def. Br. at 23-27).
The Utah Supreme Court has written, "[antagonistic defenses alone are not
sufficient to require a separate trial. The test of whether antagonistic defenses by two
defendants require severance is whether the conflict in the co-defendants' respective
positions at trial was of such a nature that, considering all the evidence in the case, the
defendants were denied a fair trial." State v. O'Brien. 721 P.2d 896, 898-99 (Utah
1986). In other words, a defendant must show that harm or prejudice resulted by the
denial of severance. IJL at 899. Therefore, the general test for severance also applies
where there is a claim of antagonistic defenses: if there had been separate trials, is
there a reasonable likelihood that defendant would have been acquitted? Velarde. 734
P.2dat445&n.l0.
Just as he has never established that he was, in fact, a a coerced participant"
(Def. Br. at 29) in the murder (see II.A. above), defendant has failed to establish how
codefendant's alibi defense prejudiced him. Indeed, the arguments from trial that
defendant cites in his brief are codefendant's arguments about how he could be
prejudiced from a joint trial with defendant, not the other way around (see Def. Br. at
24-25). That codefendant's alibi defense could be undermined by defendant's
confession that he "went to Willard Bay with the victim and codefendant, and that he
witnessed the murder, but that it was the codefendant. . . who actually committed the
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murder" (Def. Br. at 23), may have some merit. But whether it was codefendant or
someone else pulling the trigger at the murder scene, defendant's confession established
his own criminal liability as a party to the murder.
Defendant's own corroborated admissions about getting the victim to the murder
scene, that he was present during the murder (R. 1409-1410; R. 1764; State's Exhibit
37A), got another clip to load in the gun after the victim had already been shot (Id.),
dragged the body into a ditch (Id.), and destroyed the murder weapon (R. 1763; State's
Exhibit 37A), would be sufficient to convict defendant as a party to the murder whether
or not he had been tried separately. In other words, given defendant's admissions, it is
not reasonably likely that, if he had been tried separately, he would have been
acquitted.
B. Party liability. The State referred to the accomplice instruction and to party
liability in its opening statement (R. 821-22). Based on the evidence presented and the
State's closing argument, it was clearly the State's theory that codefendant committed
the murder and defendant was guilty as a party (s££ R. 2249-2251). The party liability
statute states:
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct.
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1996).
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1. Mental state required: intent to kill. Defendant argued during closing that his
retrieval of the extra clip of ammunition to provide to codefendant did not cause the
victim's death since, before the final bullet was fired under the victim's chin, he was
"either dead or very close to it" (R. 2279).
However, defendant's participation in the murder didn't begin at the end. It
began with the motive he shared to "do something" to the victim because the victim
was selling diluted drugs (R. 1161-62, 1196-97, 2138, 2146-47). It continued when he
and codefendant picked up the victim at his house and drove to the murder scene at
Willard Bay. Defendant's participation continued as he stood by and watched
codefendant fire a clipful of shots into the victim. Defendant's actions in going back to
the truck to get more bullets, since the victim was still moving, revealed that defendant
had not simply been a witness, but shared codefendant's intent to kill. Indeed,
defendant's confession revealed that the victim didn't stop moving until the final shot
was fired (R. 1410: "[Defendant] went back to the Blazer and got another clip. . . .
[T]he new clip was loaded and the gun was placed under Troy's chin and the trigger
pulled one last time. [Defendant] then said Troy did not move any more . . . . " ) .
The mental state required for murder is an intent to kill. £fi£ Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-203(l)(a) (1996). Therefore, for defendant to be convicted as a party to murder,
he had to act with the intent to kill when he aided another to engage in conduct which
constituted murder. It is clear that defendant's act did not have to cause the victim's
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death. One who encourages or aids another in committing a crime may be convicted of
that crime even though he did not personally commit it. State v. Johnson. 745 P.2d
452, 455 (Utah 1987): see Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1108 (Utah 1983).
That is the essence of the party liability statute.
In State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993), a first degree murder case, the
defendant argued that the evidence did not establish that he caused the victim's death or
that he acted knowingly and intentionally. Although he conceded that he was present
during the fatal beating, Wood argued that there was no evidence he struck the fatal
blow or intended that the victim be killed. Specifically, Wood asserted that any blow
he struck during the beating was not life threatening. The Utah Supreme Court held
that "[t]he blow did not have to be life threatening. It is enough that [the defendant]
kicked [the victim] in the jaw and was otherwise cooperating with Archuleta while
Archuleta was viciously beating [the victim] with a tire iron and a jack in the fatal
encounter. Clearly, the jury could find that what Wood did, he did knowingly and with
the intent that Church be killed, even if Wood's role was secondary to that of
Archuleta." I$Lat88.
Such is the case here. Defendant was not simply an idle bystander or witness
who chanced upon the murder. Although secondary to codefendant's actions,
defendant's actions in helping get the victim to the murder scene and cooperating in the
fatal encounter, including getting more ammunition, disposing of the body, and
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destroying the murder weapon, are sufficient to demonstrate that defendant shared the
intent to kill.
2. Intentionally aid. Although defendant has suggested that he was under duress
during the murder (Def. Br. at 29; R. 2279, line 3; R. 2280, lines 15-16), the record
on appeal contains no evidence of duress ($££ II. A. above). It does, however, contain
ample evidence that defendant intentionally aided the codefendant in committing the
murder:
Defendant and the codefendant picked up the victim and drove him to the murder
scene at Willard Bay (R. 1409).
Defendant stood by as codefendant fired a clip of bullets into the victim (R.
1409-1410).
Defendant then left the wounded victim, went to the truck, and instead of
escaping or leaving the murder scene to summon help, returned with additional
ammunition (R. 1410). (Live .22 rounds, matching shell casings at the murder scene,
were later found in defendant's vehicle - R. 1066, 1097-98, 1776-77; State's Exhibit
39).
Defendant provided that ammunition to codefendant, the person who had actually
been pulling the trigger. I$L
After the final shot, when the victim stopped moving, defendant dragged the
body into a ditch. I$L
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And defendant destroyed the murder weapon (R. 1763).
Defendant's subsequent statements also demonstrate his consciousness of guilt
for the murder, not remorse that he was forced to participate:
I'm sorry truly. But the death of Troy has been hanging on my mind,
driving me crazy. I am going to tell the police the truth. If I don't I get
life. Actually the death penalty will probably be imposed. I have a very
guilty conscience. . . .
(R. 1763; State's Exhibit 37A).
. . . I hope you and everyone else will forgive me for lying to you and to
them, but I was scared. . . . If word gets out that I was there it could put
me in prison for life. . . .
(R. 1764; State's Exhibit 37A).
. . . I'm sitting here again. It's about 4:30 a.m. I woke up having the
nightmare about Troy's death. How I was sitting there discussing if he
wanted to buy the gun how he would pay for it. I bet I still have skid
marks in my pants that I was wearing. You never know, though, they
might still try to press it on me. Just because I held out on telling them
what they need to know. Maybe if I just die I won't have to. . . .
(R. 1764-65; State's Exhibit 37A).
Defendant asserted he was "going to tell the police the truth" (R. 1763; State's
Exhibit 37A). Why didn't that (or, for that matter, hasn't that) included the fact that he
was under duress when he participated in the murder? Why would defendant assume
he was going to "get life" or that "the death penalty will probably be imposed" (Id.)?
Why would he have "a very guilty conscience" if he were not an active participant in
the murder (MJ?
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Why would defendant initially lie about being at the murder scene (R. 1764;
State's Exhibit 37A)? And, when he disclosed that he was there, why wouldn't he
attempt to reduce his culpability by asserting that he had been under duress?
Finally, if he were innocent, why would defendant contemplate death rather than
face the charges (R. 1765; State's Exhibit 37A)?
The simple answer to all these rhetorical questions is that defendant's actions and
statements clearly establish that he intentionally aided in the victim's murder and
expected to be held criminally liable. His expectation is fully supported by law:
because he shared the intent to kill, and because he intentionally aided in the murder of
Troy Weston, defendant was properly convicted as a party to his murder. Utah Code
Ann. §76-2-202 (1996). There is no reasonable likelihood that, had he been tried
separately, he would have been acquitted. Jaimez. 817 P.2d at 825; Velarde. 734 P.2d
at 445 & n. 10. Therefore, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to sever should
not be disturbed.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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